Small parties and independents – from also-rans to kingmakers by Africa, Cherrel & van Rooyen, Garth
 191 
www.sun-e-shop.co.za © 2012 SUN MeDIA MeTRO and authors. www.africansunmedia.co.za
Small parties and independents play an important role in South Africa’s democracy. It 
is on the level of the local that these small parties and independents have some chance 
to make indents in terms of winning a few wards that could turn them into council 
kingmakers, or at least represent some particular local constituency needs. This chapter 
examines the multitude of small and micro-parties, as well as independent candidates 
in the 2011 local government elections. It first features classification-based endeavours 
to ‘make sense of this multitude of often-neglected but crucial political players in South 
Africa’. The classifications use the number of contesting candidates and election outcomes 
as the two classificatory principles. The chapter also explores the increase in contestation 
by independent candidates. Thereafter it investigates the details of their results, and the 
reasons for their largely dismal displays in local election 2011. The chapter concludes that 
while these political actors remain largely in an underworld of small and micro-parties, they 
retain enthusiasm for electoral contestation, thus continuing to add value to multi-party 
democracy in South Africa. 
INTRODUCTION
Local government elections are particularly important for small political parties in 
South Africa. It is the arena where small parties and independent candidates can 
establish direct links with communities and community-level stakeholders. It is on 
the level of the local that small parties have a chance of winning a ward or, when there 
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is no outright winner, they can play the council kingmaker role. The local is where 
communities can entrust parties with local standing to represent them. Small parties 
and independent candidates can, therefore, play crucial roles in the political processes 
of the local. 
The 2011 local government election saw a proliferation of small and micro- 
parties, and independents. The number of contesting parties increased from 97 in 
2006 to 121 in 2011 and independent candidates increased from 663 in 2006 to 754 
in the 2011 local government election. Many expected to benefit from heightened 
frustration with the African National Congress (ANC) as expressed through increased 
service delivery protests (see Booysen, Chapter 17). This frustration around a perceived 
lack of sufficient service delivery was compounded by dissatisfaction with the ANC’s 
internal candidate selection process. The pre-election occurrences ignited hopes that 
small parties and independent candidates might inject new faces and fresh political 
perspectives into South Africa’s political arena.
The high hopes of independent candidates and small parties were dashed at the 
polls. Their electoral support turned out to be fractional and in fact even lower than 
in previous elections. Thus, despite increased contestation of small political parties, 
residents’ associations and independents, the most notable trend of the 2011 election 
was the definite movement away from smaller parties. 
The Democratic Alliance (DA) was the primary beneficiary of the migration away 
from smaller parties. For the DA this exodus was a culmination of ongoing campaign 
messages since 2004. The DA had been actively promoting a move towards a two-party 
state by emphasising that small parties ‘fracture the opposition’ and that a vote for 
such a party is a ‘wasted vote’ (Independent Online, 18 March 2004). The DA’s Athol 
Trollip went as far as to say that the 2011 election ‘will spell the end of smaller parties’ 
(Stolley, 2011). The DA’s victory, however, was a hollow one as it effectively engendered 
a reduced set of political options for voters. 
The bleak outlook for small parties prompted some political analysts to question 
the prospects of their continued existence. For example, Petlane (2009:193-194), 
whilst acknowledging that ‘there may still be space and support’ for smaller political 
parties, argues that the relevance of small parties is under threat because the rainbow 
nation has in large part succeeded and ‘minority groups have been accommodated and 
accorded their proper space in a multi-cultural society’. However, without detracting 
from significant reconciliation achievements since 1994, South Africans are a long way 
from being fully reconciled. Historical antagonisms, structured primarily around racial 
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fault-lines, still manifest in public discourse on a regular basis. Anger and bitterness 
between groups continue to simmer below the surface, and occasionally spill into 
the open. 
This chapter examines the performance of the multitude of small and micro-
parties, as well as independent candidates, in local election 2011. It first features 
classification-based endeavours to ‘make sense of this multitude of often-neglected 
but crucial political players in South Africa’. The classification uses the number of 
contesting candidates and election outcomes as the two classificatory principles. 
The chapter also explores the increase in contestation by independent candidates. 
Thereafter the chapter explores the details of their results, and the reasons for their 
largely dismal displays in local election 2011.
CLASSIFYING THE SMALL CONTESTANTS IN SOUTH AFRICA’S 
LOCAL ELECTION 2011
To develop a typology of political parties in South Africa, one can refer to existing 
classification typologies. Gunther and Diamond (2003) develop a complex typology, 
which distinguishes 15 different species of party based on the level of formal 
organisation, programmatic commitments and strategy. Criteria for party classification 
identified by Gunther and Diamond which are applicable in the South African context 
include decision-making procedures, the extent of organisational structure, minority 
versus broad-based representation, ideology, religious orientation and whether it has 
a broad catch-all focus. Additional criteria relevant to South Africa not identified by 
Gunther and Diamond include whether the party is nationally, regionally or locally 
based and whether it was registered as a political party at the outset, emerged from a 
civic movement or organisation, or still is a civic organisation, but has stood for election. 
Overtly religious parties and single-issue parties (as identified by the party’s 
name) can easily be categorised using these criteria. However, many of the 121 
parties that participated in local election 2011 have names that provide no clues to 
their ideological, religious or programmatic sentiment. Even more problematic for 
the operationalisation of any form of typology in South Africa is the lack of publicly 
accessible primary or secondary information about these parties (or their leaders), 
which is necessary for the process of classification. 
Small parties by candidate diffusion
A nuanced classificatory option that enables insights into the party’s organisational, 
infrastructure and resource base is that of the number of candidates the party fields 
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in an election. This measure is also sensitive to the micro-level of small community 
parties that may nominate only in concentrated geographical areas. An analysis of 
the 121 parties that contested local government election 2011 reveals that the vast 
majority of them can in fact be classified as micro- or small parties. 
Table 1 shows that in terms of the schema developed for the analysis, 15 (12 
percent) of the 121 parties participating in the 2011 election can be classified as 
micro-parties – they fielded fewer than 10 candidates each to contest the election. 
This category consisted primarily of residents’ associations and some localised parties, 
which hardly have any party organisational infrastructure. Category 2 parties fielded 
between 11 and 50 candidates, which indicates small parties and very limited party 
infrastructure and resources. Overall, 44 parties (36 percent of the party contestants) 
could be placed in this category (IEC, 2011). 
Table 1. Party (electoral participant) classification by number of candidates fielded
Size classification 
by number of 
candidates 
Category
Number of 
candidates fielded 
by the party
Number of 2011 
parties in the 
category
Percentage of parties 
in the category (%)
Micro
Category 1 1-10 15 12.4%
Examples include Umhlaba Uhlagene People’s United Nations (UUPUN), Liberal 
Democratic Party (LDP), Ou Pacaltsdorp Inwonersvereniging (OPRA), Beter 
Bloemhof Party (BBP) and Student Stem Party (SSP)
Very small
Category 2 11-50 44 36.4%
Examples include Solidarity Party (SP), African Independent Congress (AIC), 
Civic Democrats (CD), Socialist Civic Movement (SCM) and the Working 
Together Political Party (WTPP)
Small
Category 3 51-200 39 32.2%
Examples include the Khoisan Party (KP), People’s Democratic Movement 
(PDM), Royal Loyal Progress (RLP), Truly Alliance (TA) and United Action Front 
(UAF) 
Category 4 201-500 11 9.1%
Examples include the Minority Front (MF), Movement Democratic Party 
(MDP), National People’s Party (NPP), Pan Africanist Movement (PAM) and 
United Resident’s Front (URF)
Smaller-medium
Category 5 501-2,000 2 1.6%
UCDP and Azapo
Medium
Category 6 2,001-3,000 6 5.0%
APC, IFP, NFP, PAC, UDM and FF+
Large
Category 7 3,001-9,403 4 3.3%
ANC, DA, COPE and ACDP
Total 121 100
Source: IEC, http://www.elections.org.za, various windows, accessed 20 August 2011.
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Parties in categories 3 and 4, fielding between 51 and 200, and 201 and 500 
candidates, respectively, can be seen as small, but with a higher level of organisation 
than parties in category 1 and 2, and achieving some ability to be bigger than a one-
community player. In total 39 parties were classified as category 3. Similar descriptions 
apply to parties in category 4, which had 11 parties. Category 5 parties are the so-called 
smaller-medium parties. Only two parties qualified for category 5. These were the 
United Christian Democratic Party (UCDP), a regionally based North West province 
party, fielding 606 candidates and the Azanian People’s Organisation (Azapo) which 
fielded 1,491 candidates (IEC, 2011).
Category 6 can be viewed as the medium parties that fielded between 2,001 
and 3,000 candidates. The six parties that fit into category 5 were the African People’s 
Convention (APC), Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP), National Freedom Party (NFP), 
Pan Africanist Congress of Azania (PAC), United Democratic Movement (UDM) 
and the Freedom Front Plus (FF+) – the bulk of these political parties that also have 
representation (albeit ranging only from minimal to modest) in the Parliament of 
South Africa. The largest parties, according to this classification, were the African 
National Congress (ANC), the Democratic Alliance (DA), the Congress of the People 
(COPE) and the African Christian Democratic Party (ACDP). The ANC fielded the 
most candidates (9,403) while the DA had the second largest proportion of candidate 
nominations and fielded 7,117 candidates (IEC, 2011). 
Classification by electoral support is a more stringent test of party size because 
the number of candidates fielded does not necessarily translate into better results 
at the polls. Table 2 shows that half (50 percent) or 60 of the 121 entities, which 
contested fit into category 1 – in other words they did not win any seat of any type. 
These can be classified as micro-parties. Using this classification system, 42 parties or 
35 percent won between one and five seats. These are classified as very small parties. 
Again, this group did not have any defining characteristics. However, many overtly 
religious parties and residents’ associations fell into this category. Collectively then, 
102 parties or 84 percent of those that contested the 2011 election can be classified as 
micro- or very small, because each had won a maximum of five seats (and more than 
half of them no seat at all). Many of these parties or entities were based in a single 
municipality or were single-issue parties.
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Table 2. Party (electoral participant) classification by electoral outcome
Size classification by 
electoral outcome
Category
Number seats won 
by the party  
(ward or PR)
Number of 
parties in the 
category
Percentage of 
parties in the 
category
Micro Category 1 No seats won 60 49.6%
Very small Category 2 1-5 seats won 42 34.7%
Small
Category 3 6-10 seats won 4 3.3%
Category 4 11-20 seats won 4 3.3%
Smaller-medium Category 5 21- 100 seats won 6 4.9%
Smaller-large Category 7 101-400 seats won 3 2.5%
Large
Category 8 1,555 seats won 1 0.8%
Category 9 5,633 seats won 1 0.8%
Total 121 100.0
Note: There was only one party in category 8 and 9, therefore, the numbers are not continuous from 
category 7. 
Source: IEC, http://www.elections.org.za, accessed 20 August 2011. 
Overall, four parties or three percent won between 6 and 10 seats. The Independent Civic 
Organisation of South Africa (ICOSA), founded by controversial former ANC Central 
Karoo District Municipality manager Truman Prince, and the National People’s Party 
(NPP) won six seats each. The Bushbuckridge Residents Association (BRA), managed 
to secure seven seats. Categories 4 and 5 are the smaller-medium sized parties. This 
band of categories only had 10 parties in it. Azapo, the Minority Front (MF), the 
African Independent Congress (AIC) and the Mpumalanga Party (MP) each obtained 
15 seats. Both the MP and AIC are strongly regional, founded in protest against the 
ANC government’s provincial boundary demarcations. The MP first contested in 2011 
(rebelling against being allocated to Limpopo instead of Mpumalanga) and the AIC 
first contested in 2005 (protesting against being placed in the Eastern Cape instead of 
KwaZulu-Natal), and winning 10 seats on that occasion (IEC, 2011). 
Parties in category 6 and 7 are classified as medium-sized parties. The UCDP, 
APC and FF+ won 25, 28 and 38 seats, respectively, while the ACDP and PAC both won 
40 seats. The UDM won 65 seats. Category 7 had three parties namely the IFP, COPE 
and the NFP. These parties won 352, 236 and 224 seats, respectively. According to this 
criterion, only two parties, the ANC and DA, could be classified as large. The ANC won 
a total of 5,633 municipal seats and the DA won a total of 1,555 (IEC, 2011).
Parties that fielded more candidates could secure more seats. However, this is 
not always the case. For example, the socially conservative and Christian ACDP fielded 
3,735 candidates, while the left and Black Consciousness-oriented PAC nominated 
2,985, the APC (a party formed as a splinter from the PAC under the leadership of 
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Themba Godi in September 2007) 2,158 candidates and Azapo 1,491. These relatively 
high totals indicate more infrastructure and organisation than a party that could 
field 10 or fewer candidates. Yet these parties did not perform at the 2011 polls, 
only securing 40, 40, 28 and 15 seats, respectively. On the other hand, the AIC and 
MP fielded 74 and 175 candidates, respectively, and both won 15 seats (for the AIC 
this was a five-seat improvement on 2006). This could be due to the fact that fielding 
more candidates can in fact stretch limited party resources (and therefore, campaign 
capacity), which in turn can negatively affect the eventual outcome for the party (IEC, 
2011). Both the AIC and the MP have narrow geographical presences.
PERFORMANCE IN THE 2011 ELECTION
Parties, such as the AIC and MP, which were primarily formed to advocate around 
municipal location relative to provinces, performed relatively well, with their 15 seats 
each. The AIC secured 8,605 ward votes and 23,414 proportional representation (PR) 
votes. The MP obtained 12,882 ward votes and 13,429 PR votes (for a more complete 
discussion of these parties, see Cherry, Chapter 4; Booysen, Chapter 17). Two other 
small parties that were successful in the 2011 election are ICOSA and the Karoo 
Gemeenskapsparty (KGP). ICOSA, a party that is no stranger to coalition agreements, 
won a majority of three PR seats in the Kannaland municipality of Ladismith in the 
Western Cape. The ANC and DA each won two PR seats (IEC, 2011). ICOSA formed 
an alliance with the ANC to secure municipal government in Kannaland. A newly-
established party, the KGP, loosely translated as the Karoo Community Party, won 
three out of seven PR seats in the Prince Albert Local Municipality. The ANC and 
Democratic Alliance each won two PR seats (IEC, 2011). The KGP eventually formed 
an alliance with the ANC to co-govern in the Prince Albert Local Municipality.  
Parties with more generalised goals did not attract much support. Examples of 
these are the Black Economic Empowerment Party (BEE) which received only 60 ward 
votes and 154 PR votes and the South African Determined Volunteers (SaDev) which 
received a paltry 68 ward votes and 66 PR votes. Parties such as the Khoisan Party 
(KP), which targeted a single ethnic-identity group, also performed poorly – it gained 
262 ward votes and 298 PR votes (IEC, 2011).
The 2011 election was devastating to those identified as medium-sized parties 
(namely Azapo, the ACDP, PAC, UDM, MF, UCDP and FF+). As an illustration of the 
dismal results in this category, the ACDP took 0.6 percent of the PR component of 
the total vote in 2011 while the FF+, PAC and the MF each took only 0.4 percent of 
the PR vote. Azapo took a mere 0.2 percent of the PR vote nationally-calculated in 
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2011. These results are in fact worse than the already low electoral support received by 
these parties in the 2006 municipal elections. The UDM performed fractionally better 
obtaining 0.6 percent, up from 0.3 percent in 2006 (IEC, 2011).
The situation becomes even more desperate on consideration of these parties’ 
losses in absolute number of votes rather than percentages (Table 3). The PAC took 
the largest loss, declining from 109,816 PR votes in 2006 down to 54,846 PR votes 
in 2011, thus shedding 54,970 votes. These PAC votes were largely syphoned by one 
of the PAC’s splinter groups, the APC. The APC obtained 54,332 PR votes, primarily 
in Mpumalanga and Limpopo. The other PAC offshoot, the Pan Africanist Movement 
(PAM) received fractional support – only 2,352 PR votes (IEC, 2011).
Table 3. Change in party support between 2006 and 2011, local government elections on the 
 PR ballot
Party
2006 2011 Increase/Decrease
Valid PR 
Votes
% Valid PR 
Votes
Valid PR 
Votes
% Valid PR 
Votes
Total Votes gained or 
lost
ACDP 128,990 1.31% 78,737 0.59% -50,253
Azapo 30,321 0.31% 26,300 0.20% -4,021
FF+ 94,140 0.96% 53,931 0.40% -40,209
MF 42,530 0.43% 53,042 0.40% 10,512
PAC 109,816 1.11% 54,846 0.41% -54,970
UDM 129,047 1.31% 84,623 0.63% -44,424
UCDP 62,459 0.63% 25,971 0.19% -36,488
Source: IEC, http://www.elections.org.za, various windows, accessed 30 May 2011.
The ACDP came in second in the losses stakes in this category by shedding 50,253 
votes. The UDM lost 44,424 votes since the 2006 election and the FF+ lost 40,209 
votes. Only the MF gained, namely 10,512 votes (IEC, 2011). Whilst in the overall 
picture these losses are modest, for parties with such low levels of existing support 
the results constitute a major local-to-local election loss. For the PAC, it means a loss 
of about half its 2006 votes. The associated forfeiture of council seats amounts to 
massive losses of party resources and infrastructure, including income from monthly 
councillor contributions to the party, public funding of parties, and the knock-on 
effect of lessened profile due to no representation in some municipalities. 
The overall value of small parties was somewhat upgraded through the need to 
form coalitions in the councils where no single party had achieved an outright win. 
It was especially in the Western Cape and KwaZulu-Natal that small parties held the 
balance of power and became council kingmakers because of winning a strategically 
important seat. For example, in Swellendam, Western Cape, the ANC and the DA 
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each won four seats and the ACDP took the remaining seat. It opted to co-govern 
with the DA. Lengthy deliberations fleshing out practical aspects of the agreement 
caused delays in formalising post-election governance structures. ACDP Western Cape 
provincial leader, Grant Haskin (personal communication, 1 September 2011), noted 
that it took the two parties three months from the 18 May elections to settle complex 
co-governing dynamics and sign the agreement as some contentious agenda items 
were escalated to the parties’ provincial leaderships to resolve. According to Haskin, 
such delays were preferable to potential future instability amongst co-governing 
partners. Many of these coalition arrangements remained strained into 2012 due to 
a number of underlying factors. These included the adversarial nature of the 2011 
campaign and the rapid rate at which key role-players (who did not necessarily trust 
one another) needed to acclimatise to their newly-acquired governance roles (Haskin 
personal communication, 24 January 2012). This may be compounded by the fact that 
the national imperatives of political parties may be at odds with the reality of local 
political complexities.
INDEPENDENTS IN THE 2011 LOCAL GOVERNMENT ELECTIONS
By definition, independent candidates are not linked to any political party and can only 
contest at the ward level in South Africa’s local government elections. They therefore 
generally do not have access to the infrastructure and resources that are available to 
established political parties. 
The 2011 local government election is likely to be remembered for the surge in 
contestation by independent candidates. In the 2011 local government elections there 
were 29,570 ward candidates, 754 of whom were independents (IEC, 2011). Thus 
there was a 14 percent increase over the 667 who had registered for the 2006 local 
elections. As seen in Table 4, a total of 844 independents were initially nominated as 
ward candidates for the 2011 elections. However, only 754 independent candidates 
eventually contested. This was due to the fact that some candidates failed to submit 
required documents and/or the deposit of R1,000 before the deadline stated in the 
IEC’s election timetable. Some also withdrew in compliance with the ANC’s appeal to 
those affected by candidate disputes not to oppose the ANC, but to let the party settle 
the issue post-election. 
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Table 4. Nomination and registration of independents in the local election 2011, by province 
Province
Number of independent candidate 
nominations
Number of certified  
independent 
candidates
Eastern Cape 182 165
Free State 35 31
Gauteng 86 80
KwaZulu-Natal 119 107
Limpopo 182 172
Mpumalanga 53 46
North West 62 54
Northern Cape 30 27
Western Cape 95 72
Totals 844 754
Sources: IEC, http://www.elections.org.za, accessed 30 May 2011.
Many independents stood for election in areas marked by dissatisfaction with the 
ANC’s candidate selection processes. The ANC’s nomination process has traditionally 
been complex, involving an intricate combination of consultations with various 
stakeholders and internal party structures. In 2007 at their 52nd National Conference, 
the ANC adopted a resolution to ‘strengthen list guidelines and processes for public 
representatives to enhance democratic participation’ (ANC, 2007). As a result of this 
resolution, and to mitigate against damage to the party’s image in view of increased 
service delivery protests as well as extensive media coverage on allegations of 
corruption, mismanagement and poor governance in municipalities, the ANC altered 
its candidate selection process to allow for greater community involvement. Higher 
ANC structures stepped in, however, to augment the final list in terms of demographic 
balance and political alignment of local candidates.
The changes in the selection process had unintended consequences when in 
some instances the communities’ preferred candidates did not make it to the final 
candidate list. The exact number of former ANC candidates running as independents 
cannot be verified because the IEC’s registration process does not require independent 
candidates to state their former party affiliation. Frustration with the candidate 
selection process was extensive enough for the Election Monitoring Network (EMN) 
to report that the majority of pre-election instances of violence were as a result of 
tensions around candidate selection rather than inter-party conflict (EMN, 2011:4). 
 201 
Small parties and independents – from also-rans to kingmakers
www.sun-e-shop.co.za © 2012 SUN MeDIA MeTRO and authors. www.africansunmedia.co.za
Registration patterns of independents
Table 5 shows that the greatest number of independents contested in the Eastern 
Cape and Limpopo. The provincial breakdown of the 754 registered independents was 
as follows: Limpopo (172), Eastern Cape (165), KwaZulu-Natal (107), Western Cape 
(72), Free State (31), Gauteng (80), North West (54), Mpumalanga (46) and Northern 
Cape (27) (IEC, 2011). Table 5 shows a 12-percentage point increase in independent 
contestation in Limpopo. In absolute terms, the number of registered candidates 
more than doubled from 75 in 2006 to 172 in 2011. The number of independents in 
the Eastern Cape also increased sharply from 128 to 165. 
Table 5. Local election registration of independents, 2000-11
Province
2000 elections 2006 elections 2011 elections Percentage 
point 
difference from 
2006
Count
Percent 
(%)
Count
Percent 
(%)
Count
Percent 
(%)
Eastern Cape 134 19.94 128 19.34 165 21.88 2.55
Free State 48 7.14 45 6.80   31 4.11 -2.69
Gauteng 74 11.01 80 12.08   80 10.61 -1.47
KwaZulu-Natal 100 14.88 108 16.31 107 14.19 -2.12
Limpopo 76 11.31 75 11.33 172 22.81 11.48
Mpumalanga 57 8.48 61 9.21   46 6.10 -3.11
North West 66 9.82 86 12.99   54 7.16 -5.83
Northern Cape 25 3.72 12 1.81   27 3.58 1.77
Western Cape 92 13.69 67 10.12   72 9.55 -0.57
Totals 672 100 662 100 754 100 -
Sources: IEC, http://www.elections.org.za, various windows, accessed 30 May 2011. 
The greatest number of independents contested in smaller municipalities consisting 
of 30 or fewer wards. Contesting in smaller municipalities is, coincidentally, a 
strategic choice because these candidates are more likely to win support in such areas. 
Candidates contesting in smaller wards also stand a greater chance of becoming a 
kingmaker. There were only a few wards where two independent candidates contested 
and there were no wards with three or more independents in the race (Berkowitz, 
10 May 2011). 
How independents fared
Although local election 2011 was marked by a significant rise in the number of 
independents contesting, this did not translate into major shifts in support at the 
polls. The notable trend was that independent candidates failed to make any inroads 
in the 2011 local government election. Voter loyalty to the ANC overwhelmingly 
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triumphed over the unique challenge presented by independent candidates who were 
ANC members dissatisfied with the list-compilation process. Overall, independent 
candidates received 302,243 ward votes, which translated into 2.26 percent of valid 
ward votes (IEC, 2011). 
There were 45 successful independent candidates (Table 6). This was a slight 
improvement on the 34 successful independent candidates in the 2006 local election. 
Of the 45 successful independents, 12 were located in the Eastern Cape and 11 in 
Limpopo. Independent candidates won 66,597 votes (1.42 percent) of the votes cast 
in the Eastern Cape. In Limpopo independent candidates obtained 65,617 votes (1.91 
percent) of votes cast. In Gauteng not a single independent candidate gained a seat and 
only one independent was successful in the Northern Cape. 
Table 6. Successful independents in the local election 2011 
Province
Number of certified 
independents 
candidates
Number of successful independent candidates
Eastern Cape 165 12
Free State 31 2
Gauteng 80 0
KwaZulu-Natal 107 6
Limpopo 172 11
Mpumalanga 46 3
North West 54 5
Northern Cape 27 1
Western Cape 72 5
Totals 754 45
Sources: IEC, http://www.elections.org.za, various windows, accessed 30 May 2011.
There were a few instances in which more than one independent gained success in 
the same municipality: Eastern Cape municipalities: Mbhashe [Idutywa] (2 seats), 
Port St Johns (3 seats); KwaZulu-Natal municipalities: uMhlathuze [Richards Bay] 
(2 seats); Limpopo municipalities: Greater Giyani [Giyani] (3 seats), Greater Marble 
Hall (2 seats), Greater Tubatse [Burgersfort/Ohrigstad/Eastern Tubatse] (2 seats); 
North West municipalities: Rustenburg (2 seats), Moses Kotane [Mogwase] (2 seats) 
(IEC, 2011). 
REASONS FOR POOR PERFORMANCE 
In all elections since 1994, political parties (besides in some ways the DA) have been 
overshadowed by the electoral might of the ANC. The challenges faced by small parties 
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and independent candidates can be clustered into five key areas. These are financial 
constraints, negative party images in the case of small parties, limitations on campaign 
efforts and the campaign context in general, the nationally-focused political space, 
and difficulties in attracting positive media coverage. 
Firstly, small parties and independent candidates face a myriad of problems 
around limited resources and infrastructure. This affects their ability to organise and 
campaign effectively. These parties typically bemoan the lack of financial resources as 
the primary reason for their declining support levels. Yet, many small parties perform 
their best precisely at the time when they have the least amount of resources i.e. in the 
election directly after their formation. Parties such as the UDM, Independent Democrats 
(ID) and COPE performed best in the election after they were formed, but received 
reduced support at the polls thereafter. In the 2011 LGE, it was the IFP breakaway 
party, the NFP, which performed relatively well as a first-time contender. Voters who 
initially cast their ballots for these parties might feel that they are willing to give the 
party a chance but then adopt a wait-and-see attitude. Newly-established political 
parties have a short window of opportunity to establish a positive party image and gain 
voter loyalty. 
Secondly, once party images such as trustworthiness are crystallised in the 
minds of voters they have far-reaching effects. Voters are unlikely to engage with 
campaign messages delivered by alternative parties regarded as untrustworthy. 
Surveys conducted since 1994 show marginal improvements in perceptions of 
opposition parties and their leaders. However, the persistent trend has been that 
large proportions of the electorate either had a poor image of opposition parties or 
are unable to offer opinions about many of the attributes of the opposition parties. 
In contrast (even in the context of heightened service delivery protests), a majority of 
South Africans across all racial groups, including those who said that they did not feel 
close to any party, saw the ANC as a trustworthy party (Africa, 2009:67-68). 
Thirdly, opposition parties tend to position a critique of the ANC as the centre of 
their campaign strategy. This permeates their campaigns. As Mattes (2005:48) shows, 
South Africans are ‘ready and able to discriminate across policy areas, criticising 
government in some policy areas and praising it in others’. A critique of government 
performance is unpersuasive to an electorate already cognisant of what the policy 
problems are. Voters not comfortable to vote for either the ANC or the DA may simply 
opt out of the system.
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Another gradual but significant change in the political rhetoric of these parties 
is that they have become progressively more centrist in nature. For example, the FF+ 
moved from primarily highlighting issues that confront Afrikaners (FF+, 2009) to a 
greater focus on issues of service delivery and accountability (FF+, 2011). As Petlane 
(2009:192) indicates, small parties that traditionally had narrow ethnic or geographic 
constituencies have begun couching minority rights in universal rather than particular 
terms. Given that they fared better when they framed their appeals around minority 
rights, the target constituents of these parties may feel betrayed by this shift in focus. 
Small parties in South Africa have persevered over time despite attempts by the 
bigger ones to capture the small ones’ support bases. In the 2004 national election, 
the ANC under former President Mbeki dismissed small parties as being divisive 
and irrelevant. Similarly, the DA in 2004 and 2009 made a strong argument for a 
consolidated opposition vote. In the 2011 campaign the ANC and DA were somewhat 
less disparaging of smaller parties, although the DA did campaign to draw small 
parties’ support into the DA. The big parties’ moderation of attacks on their small 
counterparts could be attributed to the realisation that they could need small parties 
to co-govern, especially in the Western Cape and KwaZulu-Natal. The DA’s 2011 result 
was nevertheless boosted by its usurpation of large chunks of small party support (see 
Jolobe, Chapter 8; Greben, Chapter 19).
Fourthly, the 2011 election was in many respects a nationally-focused event 
(see Piper, Chapter 3). Indeed Western Cape ACDP provincial leader, Haskin, believes 
the ANC and DA successfully nationalised the local government election campaign, 
which crowded out the voices of smaller parties and polarised the vote into an either-
or choice – for the ANC or the DA. The 2011 local election, he argues, was epitomised 
as a choice between Jacob Zuma and Helen Zille, rather than a choice about which ward 
candidate would best represent the community. Haskin (2011) argues that the focus 
on a two-horse race was re-enforced through the open toilet saga and the Afriforum vs 
Julius Malema court case. Haskin notes that the DA’s ‘specific emphasis’ on the service 
delivery track records of parties had the effect of drowning out all those who could not 
develop such track records. 
Finally, small parties and independents receive limited national media coverage 
because media in South Africa tend to focus on the most dramatic and conflictual aspects 
of election campaigns, which usually occur between the larger and medium-sized 
parties and their leaders, and on issues that can be projected nationally. This added to 
the hurdles that small parties and independents faced – and simultaneously benefited 
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the ANC and DA that effectively used their national leaders to run a high-profile media-
intense campaign alongside the smaller parties’ more localised campaigns.
CONCLUSION
The continued relevance of small parties and independent candidates in South Africa is 
framed around their ability to secure electoral support and the idea that small parties 
are obsolete because they do not have the capacity to challenge the ANC, or the DA, 
in meaningful ways. A related argument by Petlane (2009) is that small parties have 
lessened relevance because minority statuses have become less of an issue for South 
Africans. However, when the focus is shifted from electoral performance to advocacy 
efforts, smaller parties assume more relevance. 
Notwithstanding their lacklustre electoral performances, the small parties 
and independent candidates with little chance of glory do add value to multi-party 
democracy in South Africa. Small parties (even if it is in a symbolic way) continue to 
bring minority groups into the political fold. In many instances small parties engage 
in legal action and take up issues that would not be taken up by the ANC and the DA. 
Two notable instances of this, at the national level, was the UDM’s role in challenging 
floor-crossing legislation and the role of the FF+ in securing voting rights for citizens 
outside the country. Finally, both small parties and independent candidates add to the 
multitude of voices that help democracies thrive.
Irrespective of the fact they largely remain in a wasteland of small and micro-
parties, local election 2011 showed that the multitude of small and micro-parties 
retain enthusiasm for electoral contestation. This is the other world of party politics, 
the one in which credible performances in ward and local communities matter. Some 
of the small parties (and independents) see these performances as full justification 
for their existence and for return appearances. Others, like the Mpumalanga Party, 
calculate that credible local performances are their launch pad for future challenges in 
mainstream politics. 
The likely lasting impact of local election 2011 on local parties and participating 
independents is twofold. Firstly, local election 2011 will be remembered for the 
consolidation of opposition support in the DA, to the detriment of small opposition 
parties. Secondly, local election 2011 will be recalled for its emphasis on the increased 
number of registered independents, contesting but ultimately not causing notable 
upsets. In the final instance voter loyalty toward the ANC overwhelmingly triumphed 
over the challenge posed by the upsurge in independent candidates. 
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